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Probably most people can think of at least one book which seemed, at the time of its 
publication, to highlight fundamental issues of its field and to signal evidently major 
implications for the future, but which was then not taken up with anything like the 
interest you might have expected.  For me, David Bordwell’s Making Meaning is such a 
book. Published in 1989 (1), it developed four key arguments in an extensively illustrated 
and always eloquent, if sometimes rather theory-weary, way. 
First, it drew attention to the pervasiveness of ‘a significant American industry’ 
(2) of textual interpretation in film studies (‘reading’ films, or groups of films), even in 
theory-led rather than case-study or corpus-based approaches.  
 Second, it suggested that common characteristics of the practice of reading – what 
Bordwell calls an ‘art’ or ‘craft’, likening interpretation to ‘quilting or furniture-making’ 
(3) - dominate over the differing theoretical content of particular approaches, even in 
apparently highly divergent cases. The craft element, Bordwell suggests, consists of 
inductive procedures and heuristics (especially the ‘representative heuristic’: x stands for 
all x’s, or x stands for y) which map semantic fields onto selected cues in a given film. 
Such mappings are then deployed in rhetorical arguments (using conventional topoi, 
metaphor, and enthymemes, or pseudo-deductive arguments) to build up a particular 
thematic explication or symptomatic reading.  
Third, within this practice of interpretation, Making Meaning emphasizes an 
inescapable operation of inference, even in basic interpretive procedures such as 
constructing an apparently concrete, consistent world out of film images. Relatedly, the 
book drew attention to thematic and procedural schemata (or socially organized networks 
of cognitive material) on the basis of which such inferences are often drawn.   
Fourth, in its final chapter (‘Why not to read a film’), Making Meaning criticizes 
the pre-eminence of interpretive work - what Bordwell repeatedly calls, in a provocative 
reference to New Criticism in literary study, ‘practical criticism’ - and encourages 
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alternative directions for study. Specifically, he promotes a kind of ‘historical poetics’, 
which would examine the historical conditions of particular forms of film composition 
and reception, rather than simply ascribing meaning to particular films. 
Together, the arguments summarized here amount to a powerful critique of the 
history and contemporary practice of film interpretation. Interestingly, too, the book’s 
arguments connected closely with changes during the 1980s in debates about meaning in 
a number of fields relevant to film and media studies, including the philosophy of 
language and cognitive science. For a variety of both good and bad reasons, during the 
formative period of institutionalized film studies those debates had seemed mostly 
inaccessible or just plain unattractive.  
Given Bordwell’s reputation as a scholar - already well-established by that time - 
there is little doubt that Making Meaning was widely read. It was also reviewed and in 
some quarters rebuked. But it appears not to have been especially influential. As far as I 
am aware, there has been little or no serious engagement with the arguments Bordwell 
presented or with the conceptual frameworks he drew on. All in all, Making Meaning 
remains a book more read than heeded.  Ten years on, inevitably the extent to which the 
issues it raised have not been pursued reinforces Making Meaning’s admonition 
regarding the future of film and media studies. Trends have become more fixed; and 
previously prominent critics and theoreticians have retired or moved on to other topics. A 
new settlement is visible within the field which was perhaps less evident at the time of 
the book’s first publication.  
As regards interpretive work, during the period in which Screen itself has been 
published the practices of interpretation Bordwell examined have undergone at least one 
major reconceptualisation: the widely described shift of interpretive paradigm from 
strongly textual-determinist approaches, making clear predictions about effect on 
viewers, towards more reader-based notions of meaning production, premised on 
diversity both of possible and of actually-occurring readings. Complications surrounding 
this major change of approach are the focus of my comments below. 
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From textual determinism to reader response 
 
Whatever the historical and theoretical limitations of viewing film studies of the 1970s 
and 1980s as a textually-determinist orthodoxy, there was, as has been widely 
recognized, a tendency for arguments to rely on some version of at least the following 
cluster of claims. 
By means of the organisation of their signifying features, film texts create subject 
positions and prompt a re-positioning of the spectator, understood as a non-unitary, 
‘radically heterogenous’ subject. Such acts of re-positioning are achieved, for viewing in 
particular, by a set of unconscious processes and structures which can be best understood 
in terms of psychoanalytic concepts (c.f. voyeurism and fetishism in work on female 
spectatorship (4)). In turn, a close and potentially analyzable relationship exists between 
spectatorship, understood in this way, and more general processes of ideological 
interpellation; and because of the link between film viewing, ideology, and subject 
formation, the practices of cinema production and viewing may be considered political. 
Classic realism, for instance, stands as the dominant aesthetic of bourgeois cinema and 
television; but oppositional practices are nevertheless possible, especially in avant-garde 
cinema. So too are resistant, or otherwise perverse kinds of reading and pleasure. In 
general terms, interpretation in this synthesis of semiotics, psychoanalysis and politics 
involves demonstrating the power of discourse features to construct subject positions, 
which for want of other vocabulary in this area may be thought of as ‘meaning’.  (5) 
What is so striking about the development of film and media studies over the last 
quarter of a century, however, is how intense the questioning of such positions has been. 
As regards ‘meaning’ in particular, three main shifts can be identified.  
First, critiques of work on spectatorship based on psychoanalytic structures have 
contrasted theoretical structures of female spectatorship with reported diversity in 
women’s viewing (6). In the face of such criticism, relatively abstract structures of 
spectatorship have tended to be down-played in favour of examining the differing kinds 
of significance given to texts by audiences. Over roughly the same period, distinctions 
made by Stuart Hall and later by others between different types of reading of the same 
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textual material on the basis of ideological positioning (dominant, negotiated, and 
oppositional readings) (7) hit a corresponding wedge between texts and the subject 
positions they might be thought to prescribe. Such classification of readings drew 
attention instead to differences between encoding and decoding. As accounts of such 
structured, interpretive variation were then extended (in a series of  studies offering rich 
descriptions of the surrounding social discourses inhabited by readers of any given text), 
an interest developed in audience diversity convergent with that inspired by critiques of 
spectatorship. A third major agent of change has been the simultaneous, more general 
intellectual shift towards postmodernism, presenting a fundamental challenge to the 
earlier, semiological ambitions of film studies. The theoretical possibility or likelihood of 
diversity of interpretation has been encouraged by work along such lines, especially on 
the strength of concepts suggesting indeterminacy of meaning such as polysemy, slippage 
of the signifier, dispersion and deferral of meaning, and heteroglossia. One incidental 
effect of investigations employing such concepts has been to confer oblique authority on 
empirical descriptions of interpretive diversity. 
These mutually reinforcing elements of a broad intellectual shift offered 
opportunities for new kinds of interpretive writing. The implication of homogeneity of 
effect in textual-determinist accounts of meaning, for example, appeared to deny the 
experience of culturally marginalised interpretive communities, and could now be 
empirically discredited; and while the earlier theoretical formation urged political 
critiques of ideology within a broader, Marxist framework, more recent reception-based 
studies appear more consistent with a dispersed (often implicitly Foucauldian) field of 
sub-cultural identities, agendas, and resistance.  
The resulting mix of interpretive approaches has coincided, however, with a 
down-grading of the question of interpretation in the list of investigative priorities. For 
many, the important arguments have moved on, from mechanisms for producing meaning 
(interpretation as a kind of ‘work’) into social issues of identity construction to which 
particular critical interpretations of texts can make a contribution. Against this trend, I 
want to suggest that displacing attention from mechanisms of meaning production (from 
understanding interpretation as a practice) onto what I will suggest are rather the 
determinants and rhetorical possibilities of interpretation (onto interpretations taken more 
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as outcomes or products of that practice) comes at what may prove a disastrously high 
price unless alternative directions are now explored. 
 
Interpretation and audience studies  
 
To the extent that they are considered in film and media studies, theoretical issues about 
how interpretations are generated are now usually formulated not so much in terms of 
meaning and interpretation as in terms of audience. This re-focusing – a consequence of 
the theoretical revisionism which nurtured the so-called New Audience Studies of the 
1980s (8) –can seem so natural, even inevitable, that it is easy to miss implications of the 
different terminology and conceptualization.  
There is little question that the New Audience Studies encouraged a sense of 
active reading: of readers making meaning. In doing so, such studies offered a useful 
counterpoint to earlier, textually-deterministic studies. They also sought to offer an 
account of communication which re-cast both the model of subject-positioning and also 
the canonical speech situation as typically described in linguistics, in order  better to 
reflect collaborative or corporate production, as well as one-to-many discourse delivery 
systems and what have been called ‘distanciated’ reception contexts.  
Surprisingly, nevertheless, little explicit consideration was given in such studies 
to the mechanisms of sense-making. Equally surprisingly, this omission seems to have 
attracted less criticism than other possible weaknesses: failure, for instance, to draw 
relevant distinctions between historical study of empirical audiences and selective 
presentation of contemporary readings, or to give due regard to media power and the 
formation of hegemonic readings as opposed to resistant ones. Occasionally problems 
surrounding meaning were acknowledged; but the terms in which such issues were 
discussed offered little prospect of specifying linkages between text, reader, and cultural 
context in any given act of interpretation (9).   
For critical work of the 1970s and 1980s, Michel Pecheux’s reworking of the 
Althusserian conception of interpellation (drawing on Frege and notions of 
preconstruction to develop the concept of ‘transverse-discourse’) had presented one 
model of how social assumptions might re-surface in discourse (10). In more recent, 
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reception-based debates, by contrast, reference is more likely to be made to notions such 
as variable ‘access to social codes’. ‘Social codes’ themselves are abstract meaning-
relations within a social semiotic system; talking merely about ‘access’ to such codes 
unfortunately says next to nothing about the psychological mechanisms of selection, 
retrieval, matching, or manipulation of such codes which are preconditions of any act of 
interpretation taking place.  
Faced with this obstacle, one tendency among cultural critics has been to fall back 
on describing differences between the bearers of bodies of cultural assumptions: that is, 
describing determinants rather than mechanisms of interpretation. The range of social and 
situational variables involved in audience demographics has accordingly been extended 
from race and class and gender into ever-thicker descriptions of social and situational 
variables. Audience studies has, in effect, turned away from reception understood as 
interpretation towards reception understood as demographic description and lifestyle . 
For all the evident interest of new work this re-direction makes possible, a vacuum is left 
as regards understanding meaning. 
 
Understanding meaning 
 
A different way of making my last point would be to say that audience studies has largely 
abandoned considerations of meaning in favour of considerations of textual use. To 
which a common riposte is: if there’s no such thing as stable textual meaning (either 
intended or formally-determined), then can it matter much whether you call use meaning, 
or meaning use? Or whether you bring both together under the rubric of textual ‘effect’ or 
some more evocative, but still inclusive phrase such as ‘hermeneutic process of 
appropriation’ (11)? Aren’t such terms simply alternative names for properly 
contextualised interpretation? This is the issue which now needs to be considered. 
One problem with not distinguishing meaning, use, and effect is that a whole 
range of different sorts of textual effect are flattened into a single catch-all. Besides 
‘represent’ and ‘signify’, a cluster of other verbs are also widely used in media criticism 
to signal that meaning is being conveyed: ‘communicate’, ‘express’, ‘evoke’, ‘impute’, 
‘ascribe’, and so on.  Many terms in such a list have both an everyday and also one or 
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more technical senses; ‘imply’, ‘infer’, ‘entail’, ‘presuppose’, ‘denote’, and ‘connote’ are 
obvious cases. Such words are not synonyms, near-synonyms, or mere stylistic 
alternatives: they signify different claims as to agency within a complex division of 
communicative labour. They also signal effects which can differ importantly, for instance 
as regards susceptibility to contradiction or cancelleability, strength of intuition and so 
likelihood of variation among culturally-different audience groupings, and degree of 
responsibility fairly attributable to text-producer and text-interpreter respectively.  
Boundaries accordingly need to be drawn both within the domain of meaning 
itself, and between what we consider meaning effects and other kinds of textual effect 
which are not usefully thought of as meaning (including visceral fear or shock, 
involuntary twitching with excitement, catharsis, laughter, fatigue, escapism, or long-
term trauma). Using inevitably simplistic spatial imagery, we might for instance want a 
‘lower’ or ‘inner’ boundary, between the complex object ‘the material discourse itself’ 
and perceptual, cognitive and affective consequences it prompts. Such a boundary serves 
to separate meaning from text, and also offers a reference-marker against which the 
varying degrees to which descendent representations of any given text can be judged as 
regards resemblance to that text’s apparent sense. An ‘upper’ or ‘outer’ boundary might 
be drawn where textual interpretation merges into more general reaction, response, pre-
existing opinion, attitudes, beliefs, or triggered memories – effects with less traceable 
links to the particular textual stimulus and greater likelihood of being prompted 
equivalently by other, different texts or experiences.  
Even inside the class of textual effects we decide are ‘meaning’, the question 
arises whether all discourse processing forms part of what we want to call interpretation, 
or only those aspects which go beyond an underpinning level of comprehension (the 
latter involving at least image perception, voice recognition, sentence parsing of dialogue, 
etc). Clearly not everything which might be accurately or usefully said about one set of 
processes applies to the others; and few people would want to claim that film and media 
studies is the most appropriate discipline to investigate all of these kinds of effect.  
Further distinctions need to be drawn as regards how far any meaning presented is 
assumed to restate or reconstruct some property of the text itself (‘meanings embedded 
in’; ‘the text shows’) and how far that meaning is thought of as something attributed or 
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ascribed to it (‘the audience will see this as..’, ‘your imputation is that…’).  It is hardly 
surprising, given my comments above about the paradigm shift from textual determinism 
into audience studies, that reception-led work is less interested in the production of 
meanings by discourse than in an audience’s search for ‘meaningfulness’. In this context, 
‘meaningfulness’ may be understood as kinds of significance which bring maximum 
relevance to the concerns of the interpreter, independently of links back to specific 
textual features or to an intention of (or effect anticipated by) a text-producer. Such 
meanings can of course be derived not only from texts, but from much else in our 
environment, and depend on the general capability of human cognition to interpret as a 
world of signs a world where most potential stimuli are nevertheless not there for the 
specific purpose of being interpreted by us. Problematically at the same time, though, for 
audience ethnography to sustain a claim to interest in text interpretation – rather than in 
belief systems of groups of people irrespective of their exposure to particular texts – 
some residual claim to meaning as  a property of (or as something caused by) the 
discourse itself is essential. 
The uncertainty about interpretation which results – between audiences making 
texts mean and audiences making texts meaningful – reflects a corresponding uncertainty 
within much ethnography. In that field, it is not always easy to separate what might be 
called descriptive aims (e.g. giving a voice to informants, as a corrective to accounts of 
them produced by others) and interpretive aims (e.g. selectively eliciting data on which to 
model some particular aspect of an informant’s beliefs or cultural competence). Back in 
audience ethnography itself, the uncertainty cuts into research method as well as aim: 
reporting responses to texts gathered by means of elicitation and autobiographical 
narrative may be highly appropriate to descriptive aims characteristic of reception studies 
viewed as cultural demography (and such work may still serve theoretical purposes, 
including importantly contesting earlier, speculative rather than empirical claims about 
what a given audience might think). But interpretive aims are likely to require a more 
systematic research approach. 
To explain how meanings are produced by readers as they interpret discourse, it is 
necessary to investigate the mechanisms of interpretation itself, in greater detail than is 
possible by reporting response in a holistic way: to investigate how, in a time-based 
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process which is also subject to species-level processing constraints, the mental store of 
code-meaning pairings and cultural assumptions represented by any individual reader are 
combined with a meaning potential specified by the form (or codes) of the discourse to 
produce a reading. In order to investigate a complex process of that kind, research must 
give attention to how meanings are generated by text segments of varying lengths and by 
techniques at many different levels, not just to the claimed significance of whole works.  
Experimental protocols (such as those developed in discourse comprehension research in 
psychology (12)), and perhaps a number of other methods, are likely to be needed 
alongside existing research procedures.  
In the next section I move on to consider more practical issues regarding the 
future of interpretive work. Before doing so, however, I should respond to at least one 
line of criticism of the sort of arguments I have presented: that such arguments offer 
simply a return to formalism, fuelled by a fantasy of algorithmic solutions to social 
questions of meaning and disavowing two key insights of reception studies: first, how far 
meanings depend on the specific contexts in which they arise; and second, how far they 
are shared across populations, not just dreamt up by individuals (13).  
For all their rhetorical appeal, neither of these criticisms seems to me justified. 
The ‘return to formalism’ criticism under-represents the difference between formalism’s 
emphasis on decoding features of a text and the far more socially and historically 
anchored processes I am outlining: of inference operating on a combination of textual 
representations and culturally specific, contextual assumptions. And the ‘populations not 
individuals’ criticism undervalues the way in which different interpretive communities 
diverge as social groups exactly to the extent that they employ different interpretive 
strategies and/or different cultural assumptions (that is, presumably, what makes them 
distinct from other kinds of social community). One implication of this point is that, to 
trace a social circulation of meanings, we should examine exactly those processes: that is, 
we should look at the cumulative effect of local, individual cognitive events linked 
together in causal chains of repetition and modification across a given society, rather than 
jumping straight to a macro-scale interface between text and collective public mind. 
Some interpretations in the vast chain of individual mental representations - which are 
linked together by social practices involving specific media of text transmission - will 
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resemble one another closely (and will therefore appear to belong to an identifiable 
interpretive community); others will not. This general approach has been usefully 
characterized as an ‘epidemiology of representations’, and deserves fuller discussion in 
film and media studies than it has received so far (14). 
 
Interpretive studies in future 
 
But what about the future of text interpretation in practical terms? After all, I began by 
echoing an understated polemic from a book already ten years old. What reforms of 
practice or new directions for investigation do I wish to encourage? 
One task, I believe, is to expose a degree of what might be called present 
interpretive complacency. Investigations into how interpretation takes place are needed 
which pick up threads from earlier interdisciplinary studies of signification, but without 
the hubris of a period in which the self-image of media studies was that of a vanguard 
discipline. Without losing sight of the power of post-structuralist and deconstructionist 
arguments, either, it seems imperative – if those positions are to be sustained - to argue 
them more directly in relation to other (widely unread) intellectual traditions of thinking 
about meaning, where necessary demonstrating, rather than taking simply for granted or 
on community authority, how and why fields such as modern linguistics, psychology, and 
large sections of philosophy are so intellectually or politically compromised as not to 
merit discussion.  
A second task, in my view, is to sharpen features of established rhetorics for 
presenting interpretations, moderating idioms which encourage obscurity about or 
slippage in the claims being made. That cliché of media studies, for instance, ‘Text X can 
be read as Y’ needs particular attention. After all, if texts are polysemous in some way 
which makes serious study of meaning-production unimportant, then surely it goes 
without saying that Text X can be read as Y? Besides, where readings are offered 
following this formula, at least three fairly distinct possibilities of the modal ‘can’, 
involving three different claims (and requirements for evidence), are being brought 
together. One is the relativistic assertion that it is possible for Text X to be read as Y, 
alongside as many other readings of Text X as you care to propose. The second is that 
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reading Text X as Y is in some way permissible, valid, or legitimate in ways that other 
readings are not, with that reading sanctioned or warranted by some set of criteria which 
then need to be specified. The third is that our understanding of some issue (needs to be 
specified) is now improved because, while previously reading Text X as Y had been 
unlikely or impossible on account of some contextual or theoretical impediment (needs to 
be specified), it has now become possible to read Text X as Y. 
If this attention to the instance of ‘can’ seems mere semantics - and introspective 
displacement from the public and engaged role of media studies - then I believe we must 
re-assess implications, for a field concerned with  the importance, value (and also 
potential misappropriation) of textual representations, of not considering mechanisms at 
work in constructing ‘meaning’ to be a central concern. Issues about how texts create 
meaning seem after all to apply especially in the case of a medium surrounded by 
arguments as to textual effect, including sex and violence debates, allegations of 
blasphemy and defamation, and other vexed regulatory and standards issues (15). 
This reference to public responsibilities involved in interpretation raises further 
issues about presenting or publishing interpretations. Clearly human beings are involved 
in construing aspects of their environment all day long, including a wide range of 
publicly-circulating texts. What makes ‘interpretation’ more interesting than such 
everyday activity is the greater reach and implications of interpretation by comparison 
with such routine processing. Reflecting on and talking about interpretation almost 
certainly play an important role, as a result, in socialization and in formal education. But 
unless specific claims are advanced about the benefits of presenting a reading as research, 
it seems unclear why anyone should propose that reading (and equally unclear why 
anyone else should publish or read it). Public, especially academic readings are part of a 
social, generally institutional activity: if they are to be ‘interventions’, then this will be 
because they are readings advanced for a purpose.  
The main sorts of purpose which are possible – beyond local, professional needs 
and demands – can be seen in exemplary fashion by considering what are often called 
‘exemplary readings’ (16). What gives such readings their critical influence and authority 
is an exceptional combination: the quality of unique, or at least distinctive, new insight 
which is at the same time grasped as somehow common property, revealing features of 
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the discourse or interpretive context as they can be recognized by us all. But the sorts of 
‘intervention’ such readings make possible – in themselves and by example – depend 
exactly on problematic aspects of interpretation discussed above, as can be seen if we 
disentangle senses of the word ‘exemplary’ and note the process/product ambiguity 
inherent in ‘reading’. Beyond the sense of ‘exemplary’ meaning just ‘exceptionally good’ 
lies the sense closer to ‘example’ and ‘exemplar’: that of a paradigm case, template, or 
model. Both senses combine with the different senses of ‘reading’. On one construction, 
what is to be taken up as our template are procedural features, or the practice of reading, 
potentially leading in many different directions in new cases. On a different construction, 
however, it is more the conclusions, or product, of reading which are encouraged, 
prompting replication of routines already targeted on an anticipated outcome.  
If this second construction is the more widely accepted – if emphasis is placed on 
canonical findings rather than on modelling process - then contemporary film and media 
studies risk simply proliferating readings. This will be especially the case unless thought 
is given to the role of a presented or published reading as a social action – not in the 
abstract, as part of a generally supportable or sympathetic cause, but explicitly, in terms 
of pedagogic, informative or polemical effects that presenting the reading in a given set 
of circumstances may have. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Let me emphasize: I am not proposing that studying interpretation rather than producing 
interpretations is the main task facing film and media studies. Other issues are as likely to 
be important, perhaps especially questions about new media technologies, and about 
media policy and regulation, in a period of rapid change and globalization. 
The point I want to make is a different one. If accounts of films or television 
programmes are to be offered as scholarly work, in themselves, or are to be presented as 
the main illustrative material in theoretical arguments, then more serious engagement 
with the mechanisms of meaning production and meaning attribution are needed than is 
now common. 
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Such attention to meaning is essential, if media studies are to avoid two divergent 
but complementary excesses: first, presenting as textual interpretations empirical 
descriptions of cultural behaviour which have little to do with the texts they are deemed 
to be inspired by; and second, reading texts so creatively, for maximum relevance to the 
reader’s own concerns, that readings become what Umberto Eco, calling for limits on 
interpretation, has dismissively called ‘psychedelic trips upon a text’ (17). More 
generally, renewed investigative vigour may be needed, if film and media studies are not 
in future to dissolve back into two broad strands associated with earlier disciplinary 
affiliations: one strand concerned with investigating money, policy and technology; the 
other strand – in practice if not in theory – simply a new production line in liberal studies. 
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